Abuses of Extradition

An article in last week’s Colombian newspaper, El Tiempo, addressed the problem of extraditing paramilitaries, and glossed over the unnecessary extradition of minor figures. Both issues demand the attention of the Colombian people and the U.S. government, and both require practical solutions.

Combita is, and always has been, filled with low-level defendants awaiting extradition to the United States. However, while most low-level defendants may be members of a drug conspiracy, they are not “exporters” (or “importers”) as that term is defined by United States law. U.S. law requires “personal knowledge” by a defendant, knowledge that the drugs he or she was involved with were destined for the United States, not just an assumption. Legal precedent is very clear on that. Yet despite that fact that most peripherally involved conspirators don’t have “personal knowledge,” low-level defendants continue to face U.S. indictments and extradition, when they should be facing prosecution in Colombia.

Some federal judges in the United States are aware of the fact that it is becoming common practice to extradite low-level defendants. It used to be that extraditing Colombian defendants was reserved for major traffickers, but judges today have observed more and more “little fish” in their courtrooms. The problem is that the United States allocates funds for extraditing large scale Colombian drug traffickers, but if there is a surplus of funds the U.S. does not simply find a better use for the money, it extradites more defendants. Why? Because they can and they have the money to do so.

Extradition is traumatic and should not be taken lightly. Defendants are imprisoned thousands of miles from their homes and prosecuted by people who speak a foreign language, in courts that are not particularly friendly to them. Extradited defendants, do not even have the aid and comfort of their families since, being poor, their families have little chance of securing visas.

The extradition of paramilitaries presents a different problem. The U.S. treats Colombian paramilitaries like common criminals and turns a blind eye to the gravity of the offenses they are charged with in Colombia. Instead, the United States focuses solely on charges related to narcotics trafficking. The paramilitaries must be prosecuted in their own country, contributing to the peace, justice and reconciliation called for by the Colombian people. They should be held accountable by Colombia and turn their ill-gotten gains over to the victims they abused. Treating the paramilitaries like common criminals denigrates the importance of the issue.

After the denial of the extradition request for Fredy “El Aleman” Rendon, former U.S. Ambassador Brownfield said “the [U.S.] has to make changes in [its] system to make sure that the paramilitaries continue to cooperate with the peace and justice commission” and are also prosecuted in the U.S. How? Why would the paramilitaries cooperate with the Colombian government if the Colombian government ultimately allows them to be extradited to the United States? In order to compensate for the “peace and justice” cooperation in Colombia, I suspect that the United States will ask federal judges for reductions in U.S. sentences.

For Colombia, the deal should be simple: Guarantee the paramilitaries that if they tell the truth and return their ill-gotten gains, including the fruits of those gains, they will not be extradited. If they do not, they should be barred from taking the offer and extradited forthwith. The Colombian government created the peace and justice commission as an alternative to the prosecution of paramilitaries and as a way to provide the victims of the crimes committed by the paramilitaries with reparations. But Colombia continues to undermine the sensible aims of the commission by extraditing the paramilitaries from whom they seek cooperation. It makes no sense.

The paramilitaries who have already been extradited could be sent back to Colombia. It would take great resolve on Colombia’s part to press the U.S. to do so, but it can be done. U.S. courts can set aside the convictions of paramilitaries awaiting sentencing in the “national interest” of both countries. And based on their cooperation with Colombia’s Justice and Peace process, the paramilitaries who have already been sentenced could seek to have their sentences reduced pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing for reductions of sentence on the basis of “substantial assistance.”

Both senseless policies should be halted: Extraditing paramilitaries who agree to cooperate with the peace process and extraditing low-level defendants. Extradition should once again be reserved for large scale drug dealers.

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